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The concept of ‘prior fault’ presents a number of significant challenges for the criminal law. 
The focus of criminal law (offences and defences) is necessarily event specific; we target and 
assess liability in relation to a snap-shot moment in time or a short series of acts, not as a 
judgement of prior or more general culpability or character.1 Therefore, prior fault should be 
largely an irrelevance at the liability stage.2 However, remaining faithful to this narrow focus 
in all circumstances would lead to considerable unfairness, creating an opportunity for 
defendants to manipulate legal rules to their own advantage. Some of the clearest examples of 
this arise in so-called contrived defence cases. Let’s take the example of self-defence, a general 
and complete defence where the defendant’s (D’s) use of force against the victim (V) is both 
necessary and reasonably proportionate.3 The standard operation of this defence is largely 
uncontroversial; people should be empowered to defend themselves from unlawful attack. 
However, what if D manufactures the circumstances of that ‘attack’ in order to use the law of 
self-defence to ‘justify’ her pre-planned use of force against V. For example, D wants to kill V. 
D hands V a knife and then goads V continuously until V (as anticipated) lashes out at D. D 
shoots and kills V in self-defence. 
 
In order to understand and analyse examples such as the one above, we must distinguish two 
points in time within each potential criminal event. First, and standardly, we must look at the 
time where the potential criminal offence is committed (T2), asking whether the elements of 
the potential offence are completed, and if so, whether the elements of a potential defence can 
be found. In our example above, it is likely that the offence of murder was committed by D, 
but D would also be able to raise self-defence because of the attack from V. Secondly, we must 
look at D’s conduct prior to the potential crime (T1), to ask if D has done anything to 
undermine her future use of a defence at T2. In our example, this could be D’s prior fault in 
planning, and in manipulating V, in order to create the circumstances of her own defence. It 
is at this second stage, looking back to T1, that legal rules relating to prior fault must be 
identified and applied.   
 
Issues of prior fault are (potentially) relevant across every criminal defence, and this has given 
rise to a variety of legal rules designed to prevent the application of contrived defences. 
However, the legal rules relating to prior fault are often unclear, and as we will see, are also 
inconsistent between different defences. Basic questions about what D must have done at T1, 
what she must have intended, and how this can impact liability at T2, all require investigation. 
In this article, we provide such an investigation. In Part 1 we explore the application of legal 
rules relating to prior fault within the current law, exposing areas of inconsistency and 
incoherence. Part 2 discusses the academic response to this inconsistency, including different 
models of prior fault that have been recommended in an effort to bring coherence to this area 
of law. Finally, in Part 3, building upon the academic analysis, we set out our own model of 
legal rules relating to prior fault; a model that we believe can (and should) be applied across 
all criminal defences. It is contended that the issue of prior fault can be addressed consistently, 
and that such rules should form part of any codification project.  
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Part 1: Prior fault and the current law 
Prior fault issues emerge in relation to both offences and defences.4 Indeed, as we discuss in 
Part 2 below, confusions and conflations of offences and defences can be identified as a 
primary reason for the general inconsistencies in this area. For our present purposes in Part 
1, it is simply important to identify what we mean by prior fault in relation to criminal defences.  
 
Criminal defences, properly so called, are sets of legal rules that are applied after D is found to 
have committed a criminal offence, and have the potential to fully or partially exculpate D 
from that liability. Thus, for example, the rules on intoxication and automatism are not 
criminal defences.5 The intoxication and automatism rules do not apply after D has been 
found to have committed an offence, but rather as a means of explaining D’s lack of offending, 
or (in circumstances of prior fault) as a means of constructing liability that would otherwise 
be absent. Our focus in this article is on defences only, and the application of legal rules 
relating to prior fault in this context. 
 
The central issue for prior fault and criminal defences, as with our contrived self-defence 
example above, is whether D’s prior fault at T1 should block her use of a defence at T2. If the 
defence is blocked then D will remain liable for the original offence. In order to illustrate how 
rules of this kind have developed within the current law, both legislatively and within the 
common law, we provide a brief analysis of the following defences: self-defence, duress, 
necessity, insanity, and the partial defences to murder of loss of control and diminished 
responsibility.   
 
Prior fault and self-defence    
Self-defence (the public and private defence) applies where D uses force against V in order to 
defend herself or another, where the force is subjectively necessary, and where the force is 
objectively proportionate.6 Where D is successful in a claim of self-defence, she will be fully 
acquitted. Just as we have illustrated our discussion so far with a contrived self-defence 
example, much of the literature about prior fault and contrived defences has focused on self-
defence. One of the reasons for this, though rarely highlighted, is that prior fault can arise in 
self-defence cases in two very different ways.    
 
The first potential for prior fault arises where D manipulates the circumstances of her crime 
in order to give rise to self-defence. As above, this applies, for example, where D intentionally 
provokes V into attacking her (or another) in order to use force against V in the guise of self-
defence. In this rather extreme case, it is reasonably settled law that D’s claim of self-defence 
will be unsuccessful.7 This seems correct intuitively, though the precise reason why D’s defence 
will be blocked has not been set out. The lack of clear reasoning here is important because the 
law is far less settled outside of this extreme intention-based case, for example, where D 
foresees (but does not necessarily intend) that her acts at T1 will give rise to the need for 
defensive force at T2.  
 
Outside of extreme intention-based cases, the leading authority is Rashford.8 Rashford 
involved a confrontation between youths, initiated by D, leading to a fight in which D killed V 
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with a knife. Unpicking a confused and contradictory direction from the lower court,9 the 
Court of Appeal confirmed that the question was not simply ‘who started it’, but rather whether 
D’s defensive force at T2 can be justified. However, rather than focusing on the intentions or 
foresight of D at T1 in order to gauge whether D’s defence at T2 was justified, the court in 
Rashford preferred to focus on the degree of force used by V. Endorsing a position within 
Scottish law, they continued,   
 
‘The question whether the plea of self-defence is available depends … on whether the 
retaliation [by V] is such that the accused is entitled then to defend himself. That 
depends upon whether the violence offered by the victim was so out of proportion to 
the accused's own actings as to give rise to the … apprehension that he was in an 
immediate danger from which he had no other means of escape.’10 
 
The dicta in this case, further endorsed by subsequent case law,11 deals with easy cases very 
well. Since D may not physically resist lawful force, where V is acting lawfully (i.e., acting in 
legitimate self-defence from D’s original attack) this will never necessitate further force from 
D. However, how the law will apply to more difficult cases remains in doubt. For example, 
what if V responds to D’s original provocation at T1 in a disproportionate way? The implication 
from Rashford and the subsequent cases is that D will be able to rely on self-defence. But what 
if D realises at T1 that her provocative acts are likely to illicit such a disproportionate response? 
Where D and V are involved in a confrontation, insulting words from D may not reasonably 
give rise to violence from V, but such violence may be entirely foreseeable (and foreseen by D). 
It is in these circumstances that the availability self-defence at T2 remains unclear.   
 
Moving away from contrived defence cases for a moment, the second potential for prior fault 
in self-defence cases arises in the context of intoxicated mistakes. As stated above, the first 
limb of self-defence requires D to have honestly (but not necessarily reasonably) believed that 
defensive force was necessary at T2. However, this leads to problems where D makes an 
unreasonable mistake as to the need for force due to voluntary intoxication at T1 with a 
dangerous drug (i.e., a form of prior fault). For example, D unreasonably believes, due to 
drunkenness or drug induced hallucinations, that V is attacking her. The courts have 
responded to these cases by holding that D may not rely on an intoxicated mistake when 
raising self-defence,12 and this has subsequently been codified within section 76(5) of the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
 
The application of prior fault rules in this second context, not allowing D to rely on intoxicated 
mistakes, is only relevant to defences such as self-defence that include a subjective element of 
belief. Thus, it does not apply to the other defences discussed below.13 However, even within 
this limited class of defences the rule is not consistently applied,14 and lacks a thoughtful 
defence. The Law Commission has recommended that the blocking rule for self-defence should 
be extended to all other subjective belief defences, but beyond the importance of consistency 
(which could lead us in either direction) they provide little detail as to why the blocking route 
should be preferred.15 Considering that D can rely on almost any other unreasonable belief at 
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T2,16 we need to understand why unreasonableness arising from voluntary intoxication at T1 
requires a special status.  
 
Prior fault and duress (and necessity) 
The defence of duress applies where D was threatened by someone that unless she committed 
the offence now charged with she would suffer serious injury, D reasonably believed that the 
threat would be carried out immediately, and a reasonable person in D’s position would have 
acted similarly. For example, X tells V to steal money for her, or she will have her killed.17 The 
defence of necessity arises where D’s crime is committed to avoid a greater evil. For example, 
D separates conjoined twins knowing that the separation will cause one of them to die, but 
also knowing that both will die if left unseparated.18 Where either defence applies, D will be 
acquitted. We have combined these defences within this section because the potential for prior 
fault arises in a similar way within each. Essentially, in prior fault cases, we are dealing with 
defendants who put themselves in dangerous situations at T1 that are likely to lead to offences 
being committed at T2 in circumstances of duress or necessity. For example, D voluntarily 
joins a criminal gang at T1, and is later threatened by gang members to commit a particular 
offence at T2. This issue has not been widely litigated in relation to necessity,19 but has arisen 
in several duress cases.      
 
As we move to identify the current legal rules relating to prior fault and duress, it is important 
to note first that they have changed considerably over the last thirty years. In line with self-
defence, it is likely that duress would always have been unavailable in extreme intention-based 
cases: for example, where D joins a criminal organisation at T1 with the intention of being 
threatened to commit a particular offence at T2 under the guise of duress. Indeed, going 
beyond self-defence prior fault rules, it is also well established that duress will not be available 
where D is reckless at T1 about being compelled to commit a certain offence at T2.20 However, 
traditionally, this is as far that those blocking rules have gone. Thus, D’s defence would not be 
blocked if she foresaw the chance of being compelled to commit a less serious offence at T1 
than was actually compelled at T2,21 or if she did not foresee the chance of compulsion even 
though a reasonable person might have.22  
 
The prior fault rules as they apply in duress cases have been recast and clarified in the House 
of Lords case Hasan.23 Within his leading judgement, Lord Bingham opts for an extremely 
wide view of prior fault, blocking D’s defence at T2 where she (at T1) voluntarily associates 
with another and a reasonable person (note the objective standard) would have foreseen the 
risk of future compulsion (note the lack of specific foresight as to particular offences). In Lord 
Bingham’s own words, 
 
‘The policy of the law must be to discourage association with known criminals, and it 
should be slow to excuse the criminal conduct of those who do so. If a person 
voluntarily becomes or remains associated with others engaged in criminal activity in 
a situation where he knows or ought reasonably to know that he may be the subject 
of compulsion by them or their associates, he cannot rely on the defence of duress to 
excuse any act which he is thereafter compelled to do by them.’24 
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Despite cogent criticisms of the expansion of prior fault rules in Hasan,25 it remains the 
leading authority on this issue.26 It is an authority that can be commended for clarifying the 
prior fault rules for duress on some key issues. However, as this article looks to highlight, it is 
also a decision that is made in isolation from similar rules applying to other defences, with the 
court simply stressing that duress must be maintained as a narrow defence. As a result, 
continued inconsistency is inevitable. Further, in the absence of a consistent rationale for prior 
fault rules, they lack coherence: they lack a clear standing and purpose beyond the pragmatics 
of maintaining a narrow defence. We return to these concerns below.27   
 
Prior fault and insanity 
Insanity (as a defence28) applies where a medical condition caused a defect in reason, and 
prevented D from understanding that her conduct was legally wrong.29 For example, where D 
kills V with the insane delusion that she is legally required to do so. Where the defence applies 
D will avoid liability, but may still be detained or controlled in line with the special verdict of 
‘not guilty by reason of insanity.’  
 
Despite the potential for prior fault in relation to insanity, it is an issue that has not arisen 
explicitly within case law, and has not been widely discussed in the literature. One of the few 
exceptions to this is a recent Law Commission Discussion Paper on insanity and 
automatism.30 With regard to the potential for prior fault, the Commission state,   
 
‘We have considered … the position of the individual who suffers from a recognised 
medical condition and who has, by his culpable conduct in not taking prescribed or 
authorised medicines at the appropriate time and/or in the appropriate dose, 
rendered him or herself completely lacking in a relevant capacity. Under the present 
law such a person would be treated as insane and liable to a not guilty by reason of 
insanity verdict. This seems to be out of step with the outcome in other cases in which 
the defendant has been at fault in bringing about his loss of capacity.’31 
 
Although the Commission’s example has more baring on insanity as a denial of mens rea (as 
opposed to insanity as a defence),32 the potential for prior fault to have a role within this area 
of the law is clear. What is equally clear, as the Commission highlight, is that the current law 
of insanity (unlike the defences discussed above) does not include any rules relating to prior 
fault. Unfortunately, and rather ironically, as the Commission look for a model of prior fault 
that can be applied to insanity cases, as they look to encourage consistency, they opt for 
consistency with prior fault in relation to automatism. This is unfortunate because, as we 
highlighted above, the automatism rules do not operate as a defence: prior fault for 
automatism acts to reconstruct missing elements of an offence, not to block a defence.33 What 
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33 J.J. Child and A. Reed, ‘Automatism is never a defence’ (2014) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 167-186. 
is needed is a model for prior fault rules as they apply to defences, which is the purpose of this 
paper.       
 
Prior fault and the partial defences to murder 
The partial defence of ‘loss of control’ applies where D kills while having lost her self-control 
owing to fear of serious violence or because of her justifiable sense of being seriously 
wronged.34 Diminished responsibility applies where D’s recognised medical condition led to 
an abnormality of mind which subsequently impaired her capacity and caused her to kill.35 In 
each case, partial defences will reduce murder liability to manslaughter.  
 
Both defences have the potential for prior fault, although both deal with it quite differently. In 
the context of diminished responsibility, as with insanity, there are no explicit rules relating 
to prior fault. However, something like this is achieved when the courts rule that certain 
medical conditions (e.g., acute intoxication) cannot qualify for the defence. In other words, 
conditions that demonstrate prior fault cannot be relied upon.36 Prior fault for loss of control, 
in contrast, is explicitly provided for within section 54(4) of the statute: 
 
‘[The partial defence] does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted 
in a considered desire for revenge.’ 
 
And further within section 55(6): 
 
‘In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger— 
 
(a) D's fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by 
a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse 
to use violence; 
 
(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D 
incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use 
violence;’ 
 
The aim of these provisions is clear, to prevent D from relying on the partial defence at T2 
where her acts were contrived at T1. However, again, the lack of consistency between these 
prior fault rules and the ones discussed above is striking. The explicit requirement of ‘purpose’ 
in these latest provisions essentially means that the statutory rules are limited to the 
intentional-based cases discussed earlier.37 How far D’s prior fault can block her defence 
outside of this (e.g., where she foresees but does not intend what follows) remains uncertain.      
 
Part 2: Prior fault and the search for coherence 
It is clear from Part 1 that the current law does not contain anything like a unified or consistent 
view of prior fault. Each defence has developed rules (or not developed rules) as if in complete 
isolation from the others. This, of course, can be defended: we might make a special case that 
the particulars of a certain defence necessitate some diversion from the norm. However, whilst 
we remain broadly open to such an argument, there are three reasons why it will not be 
explored further here. First, we do not have a norm to diverge from, and so trying to establish 
one within this paper may (at minimum) provide a starting point. Second, arguments 
defending diversification have not been provided in the literature.38 And third, the current 
                                                          
34 Section 54, Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
35 Section 2, Homicide Act 1957.  
36 Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281.  
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inconsistency has resulted in demonstrable problems for the law: uncertainty whether D 
requires subjective or objective foresight at T1; what D must foresee at T1; how the actions of 
V can impact D’s liability; and so on.  
 
As we begin our search for consistency and coherence, it is important to highlight what we 
believe is the central cause of the problems discussed above. That is the dominant role of the 
intoxication rules within the legal discussion of all prior fault cases. Whether prior fault is 
discussed in the courts, by academic commentators, or by law reform agencies, the focus on 
the intoxication rules as the paradigm example is almost universal. This focus is perfectly 
acceptable and indeed beneficial where we are discussing prior fault as a constructor of 
liability: rules that allow D’s prior fault to substitute for missing mens rea elements in order 
to construct liability. This is a common feature between intoxication and automatism for 
example, and thus consistency between these sets of rules seems sensible.39 However, this is 
not the way that prior fault works in relation to defences. For defences, the issue (as discussed 
in Part 1) is whether D’s prior fault should block her use of a defence, and not whether her 
prior fault is broadly equivalent to a missing element of mens rea. It is the confusion and 
conflation of offences and defences that has led to such uncertainties within the current law, 
and prevented the articulation of consistent rules on both sides. And as we see below, it is a 
problem that emerges regularly within the academic literature as well.40 
 
Criminally causing the conditions of one’s own defence   
Recognising similar inadequacies and inconsistencies between defences involving prior fault 
in different US jurisdictions, Professor Paul Robinson published his seminal paper in 1985, 
‘Causing the conditions of one’s own defence: A study in the limits of theory in criminal law 
doctrine’.41 Robinson’s analysis of ‘causing-the-conditions’ remains authoritative both 
theoretically and in its consideration of potential challenges translating theory into workable 
doctrine on prior fault. However, in its attempt to develop a singular unifying doctrine, 
Robinson’s ‘causing-the-conditions’ analysis falls into the same trap of conflating offences and 
defences discussed above.   
 
Robinson’s model for the prior fault rules does not focus on the potential blocking of a defence 
at T2, but rather on the criminalisation of D’s ‘causing the conditions’ of that defence at T1. By 
focusing on T1 in this way, and allowing D’s defence at T2, Robinson is able to avoid complex 
rules when the conditions for that defence (e.g., self-defence) are satisfied. There are several 
advantages to this. As Robinson explains, ‘it is the nature of justified conduct that it either is 
or is not justified, depending on whether it causes a net societal benefit - regardless of the 
particular state of mind, past or present, of the actor.’ Indeed, if we consider our contrived 
self-defence example, if an intervening third party would be justified in defending D from V’s 
attack, it seems strange to block D’s defence in the same circumstances.42 As noted by Dimock, 
doing so would be tantamount to deciding that ‘the person who has an affirmative defence is 
at fault in the same way as is a person who commits the same offence without a defence.’43 
Indeed, the strength of this logic led Larry Alexander to label the whole discussion a 
‘theoretical non-problem’, seeing the Robinson-type approach as self-evident.44  
                                                          
39 Supra 33. 
40 The single solution approach, inappropriately conflating prior fault issues between offences and defences,  is 
also reflected in a number of leading textbooks, for example, A. Ashworth and J. Horder, Principles of Criminal 
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at 121.    
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of one’s defence: A theoretical non-problem’ (2013) Criminal Law and Philosophy, pp.623-628. 
42 L. Alexander, ‘Causing the conditions of one’s defence: A theoretical non-problem’ (2013) Criminal Law and 
Philosophy, pp.623-628, at 626.  
43 S. Dimock, ‘Actio Libera in Causa’ (2013) Criminal Law and Philosophy, pp.549-569, at 569. 
44 Supra 42. 
 
Although Robinson would allow D’s defence at T2, D will not escape liability in circumstances 
of prior fault. That is, D’s liability for conduct at T2 is determined by her conduct and 
culpability at the time of causing the conditions of her defence. In this manner, D is held liable 
for the justified or excused offence at T2 on the basis of, 1) D causing the excusing or justifying 
condition at T1, and, 2) her culpable ‘state of mind’ (intent) at T1 with respect to the 
commission of the ultimate act at T2. Thus, D handing V a knife and goading V into lashing 
out (causing the conditions) with the intent of killing V (culpable state of mind) is deserving 
of punishment for culpably causing the offense because of D’s initial scheming conduct at T1, 
notwithstanding D’s justified self-defence at T2. In this manner, Robinson contends, D’s acts 
at T1 are similar to the use of an innocent agent, or even to a conspiracy with one’s later self. 
Conversely, had D handed V the knife for reasons other than to provoke V’s attack, D would 
raise self-defence and avoid liability for murder.  
 
Importantly, the approach to prior fault recommended by Robinson is capable of consistent 
application across all offences and defences. Indeed, Robinson provides one of his most 
convincing examples in the context of necessity. 
 
‘Assume that an actor sets a fire that threatens a nearby town to create the conditions 
that will justify his using his enemy’s farm as a firebreak. Denying a justification 
defence might dissuade him from undertaking such a scheme, but if it fails to 
dissuade him, the unavailability of the defence may reduce his incentive to set the 
firebreak and save the town.’45   
 
Robinson’s approach allows D to rely on a defence of necessity at T2, and thereby encourages 
her to ‘do the right thing’ at this moment in time. However, the approach then allows us to 
look back to D’s actions at T1 to assess whether she deserves punishment for this conduct.   
Despite excellent work undertaken by Robinson in particular to expose inconsistencies within 
the law, we do not believe that Robinson’s model for prior fault rules should be adopted. In 
the context of prior fault as a constructor of liability (e.g., prior fault intoxication, prior fault 
automatism, etc.), we agree that something like Robinson’s model provides the best way 
forward.46 However, we do not agree with Robinson that the same approach should be adopted 
for prior fault in the context of defences. This is because, in the context of prior fault defences, 
two fundamental faults emerge.  
 
The first problem with Robinson’s approach to prior fault and defences relates to the need 
(within his theory) for a causal link between D’s conduct at T1 and the harms at T2. D is not 
simply criminalised for her contribution to events, or due to a normative shift in our 
perceptions of her, but because her conduct was a direct cause. In the context of prior fault as 
a constructor of liability, it is possible to maintain an approach based on causation (e.g., D 
becomes intoxicated at T1 in order to commit an offence at T2 without mens rea47). However, 
in the context of defences it is not. For prior fault defences, between D’s conduct at T1 and the 
harms at T2, there are likely to be a number of voluntary acts that would (under any standard 
analysis) break the causal chain.48 This may include, for example, the conduct of V (e.g., V’s 
violent reaction in contrived self-defence cases), as well as the actions of D (e.g., the intentional 
commission of an offence at T2).  
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should we say about contrived ‘self-defence’ defences?’ (2013) Criminal Law and Philosophy, pp.571-585, at 578.   
The second problem with Robinson’s approach is that, when considered as a whole, it becomes 
unintuitive to the point of incoherence. Viewed in two parts, as we introduced it above, 
Robinson’s approach has some intuitive appeal: (a) D is allowed and incentivised in her 
defence at T2; (b) D is criminalised for her conduct at T1. But when we put these together, 
remembering that they apply to the same criminal event, their individual logic begins to 
unravel. Let’s return to our contrived self-defence example. Robinson’s approach would 
recognise D’s prior fault at T1 (e.g., inciting V), and use this as the basis for confirming D’s 
criminality when she kills V at T2. However, alongside this we are also expected to view that 
same killing (D’s use of defensive force) as justified and even incentivised by the availability of 
a defence at T2, even though this defence (in reality) will not prevent or qualify D’s liability at 
all. In essence, D’s offence at T2 is both justified (by her defence) and unjustified (by her prior 
fault), with liability resulting. Not only is this result rather ironic in the context of Robinson’s 
comments that conduct ‘either is or is not justified’, but it completely undermines D’s incentive 
to ‘do the right thing’ at T2, which is a central part of Robinson’s explanation.49    
 
Allowing a qualified defence at T2 
It is sometimes contended that criminalising D’s conduct at T1 or blocking her defence at T2 
are both overly absolutist, lacking the nuance and flexibility so useful within many legal rules. 
In view of this, as an alternative to Robinson’s more standard approach, certain commentators 
would allow D to rely on a defence at T2, but qualify the application of that defence in light of 
D’s prior fault. Perhaps the best example of this approach has been set out by Professor Daniel 
Farrell in the context of contrived self-defence.50 Although expressed in relation to self-
defence, the model advocated by Farrell could be adapted to serve a similar purpose across 
each of the defences discussed in Part 1.  
 
Farrell begins from the premise that a defendant will always have the moral right to self-
defence, whether that defence is contrived or not.51 This is because, for Farrell, causing harm 
to protect oneself in cases of self-defence is a form of ‘distributive justice’, provided that the 
harm caused is not ‘radically disproportionate’ to the threat faced.52 It is worth highlighting 
that Farrell’s basic approach towards the concept of self-defence is influenced by deontological 
principles. In modern philosophy, deontology is a normative theory which focuses on the 
morality of a person’s choices based on the nature of their actions (inputs) as opposed to the 
consequences of their actions (outputs). In this sense, deontological ethics are essentially non-
consequentialist in nature. Farrell argues that choosing to defend oneself by causing harm to 
another in relevant situations is justified and that one should not be deprived of this right 
(even in contrived cases) as this would infringe fundamental principles of fairness and justice. 
Hence, according to Farrell, the focus in contrived cases should be on what justice or fairness 
allows, rather than the overall utility in a consequentialist sense.53 
 
In cases of contrived self-defence, where D’s conduct at T1 contributes to the need for 
defensive force at T2, Farrell distinguishes two possibilities. In the first (standard) case, V 
responds to D’s provocation at T1 in the manner expected, and D uses defensive force. In this 
case, Farrell reasons that since V uses her free will and intentionally chooses to respond to D’s 
manipulation; it is actually V who has created a situation where D needs to protect herself 
from V’s attack, thereby being justified in causing V harm for the purpose of safeguarding 
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52 Ibid, at 573. 
53 Ibid, at 573. 
herself.54 This applies to standard cases of self-defence as well as the contrived ones. The 
operating fact here is that V could have refrained from acting in the way she did, but 
voluntarily chose not to do so. It is this element of choice and free will on V’s part that breaks 
the chain of causation and creates the moral right for D’s defensive force.55 
 
The right to self-defence is therefore universal within Farrell’s model, but, crucially, it is not 
unqualified. Rather, where D relies on a form of contrived self-defence, her use of force at T2 
will be subject to stricter standards of ‘proportionality’ and ‘minimum harm’ requirements. 
For Farrell, although D has the right to resist V’s attack, in defending herself, D can only 
perform minimum acts of self-preservation (cause no more than the ‘minimum’ harm required 
to defend herself) and in doing so must stay within the limits of proportionality.56  
 
The second (non-standard) case distinguished by Farrell will apply where D provokes V at T1, 
but V’s reaction is unexpectedly excessive and disproportionate. Farrell stipulates that this 
would be a case of shared responsibility (and not a qualified defence).57 Thus, in cases of this 
kind, D will be entitled to an unqualified defence in relation to any defensive force used against 
V: the excessive nature of V’s response effectively supersedes any original causal contribution 
from D at T1.    
 
As an alternative to Robinson’s approach discussed above, there are several attractive features 
to Farrell’s conception. The qualified defence model allows us to avoid the absurdity of both 
criminalising and excusing D’s conduct simultaneously, it usefully highlights the 
independently blameworthy contributions of V in contrived self-defence, and it also allows us 
to recognise a limited residual right of defence (something that has a plausible moral appeal). 
However, two key problems emerge when we begin to conceive of Farrell’s moral rights 
approach within a matrix of legal rules.     
 
The first problem is that, despite its importance within Farrell’s conception, there is no clear 
definition of what constitutes minimum acts of self-preservation. It is clear that Farrell’s 
threshold for granting D a defence in contrived cases is not that of reasonableness, but rather 
that of ‘minimum acts’ proportionate to the threat. But what exactly does this mean? It is 
simply not enough to state that the proportionality requirement in cases of contrived self-
defence would be stricter than the standard self-defence cases, but provide no indication of 
how strict this would be and how this would operate in practice. 
 
With regard to this first problem of practicality, it could be contended that specifics are not 
required, and that carving out degrees of reasonableness could be left to the court. However, 
even very recent history shows us that this is not correct. For example, in an effort to provide 
further protection for householders in self-defence cases, Parliament recently enacted a 
provision that attempted to carve out a degree of reasonableness above the standard line: 
allowing D to use any force against V that is not ‘grossly disproportionate’.58 However, despite 
clear reasons accompanying the policy, and despite codification of the rule, its interpretation 
in practice has been rolled back into simple reasonableness.59 The point here is that without 
clarity to a much more fine grained level, a policy of the kind advocated by Farrell remains 
largely unworkable. 
                                                          
54 Ibid, at 574. 
55 Ibid, at 577. 
56 Ibid, at 581. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Section 76(5A), Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
59 In R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 (Admin), Sir Brian Levenson P stated that ‘The 
standard remains that which is reasonable: the other provisions (and, in particular, s76(5A) and (6) of the 2008 
Act) provide the context in which the question of what is reasonable must be approached. The test in the statute is 
not whether the force used was proportionate, disproportionate or grossly disproportionate.’ 
The second problem with Farrell’s approach is more fundamental. Although Farrell presents 
a (generally) convincing picture of enduring moral rights to self-defence, there is little to 
suggest in his arguments why this moral right should also be translated into a legal right. To 
allow D even a minimum legal right of defence at T2, is to legally authorise force against V in 
exactly the circumstances manufactured and contrived by D at T1. It is our belief that even this 
minimum right, in law, would be ill-conceived. Whilst we would allow and expect V’s 
contribution to the events at T2 to be taken into account when sentencing D, we do not believe 
that D should ever be fully excused or justified in her use of force. We may have some moral 
sympathy for D in her defensive acts at T2, but moral sympathy is not (and should not be) 
prescriptive to the law.    
 
Part 3: A way forward for prior fault 
Within this final part of the article, our aim is to provide a model for future reform and 
codification of rules relating to prior fault. It is our view that a consistent and principled model 
can be adopted across each of the criminal defences. In order to achieve this, three issues must 
be (re)addressed. First, it is important to clarify our task: to identify exactly what we want 
prior fault rules to achieve in the context of criminal defences. Secondly, we set out the rules 
that we believe are appropriate for meeting that task. And finally, we question whether any 
exceptions should be recognised in relation to belief based defences, and unreasonable (prior 
fault induced) mistakes.    
 
The task for prior fault rules 
Before we can effectively advocate and defend a preferred construction of the prior fault rules, 
we must first identify precisely what we want those rules to achieve. As we have highlighted 
throughout, prior fault can be relevant both in the construction of offences as well as the 
blocking of defences,60 but it is the former that has tended to dominate legal discussion. In the 
context of prior fault as a constructor of liability, the task for prior fault rules has become 
relatively clear: to identify a formulation of prior fault which can fairly substitute for or replace 
missing elements of mens rea.61 We can disagree whether the task is achievable,62 but the 
identity of the task is reasonably settled. However, prior fault in the context of defences is 
different.  
 
In the context of criminal defences, whether D’s prior fault at T1 is equivalent to a particular 
mens rea term or not simply misses the point. Our question is whether D’s prior fault should 
block her use of a defence, not whether it can construct a crime. So what, then, are we looking 
for? In order to answer this question, we need to consider the theoretical basis for defences in 
the criminal law; we need to reflect upon why we allow individuals to escape (or at least reduce) 
liability despite having committed a criminal offence. 
 
Particularly useful for our current review is a widely accepted principle, most commonly 
associated with the work of Professor William Wilson. The principle holds that criminal 
defences should apply to exculpate D where her conduct, despite constituting an offence, does 
not reveal a blameworthy or vicious character because it represents an understandable 
response to a moment of crisis.63 What is meant here is not simply that we sympathise with D, 
                                                          
60 See also, Supra 4. 
61 See, for example, J. Horder, ‘Sobering up? The Law Commission on criminal intoxication’ (1995) Modern Law 
Review, pp.534-546, where Horder identifies an anticipation of ‘blundering’ whilst intoxicated. This is also taken 
up, in more detail, within Law Commission, Intoxication and the Criminal Law (Law Com No 314, 2009). 
62 Many commentators contend that objective fault (e.g., simple voluntary intoxication) can never sensibly 
substitute for missing elements of subjective mens rea. See, J.J. Child, ‘Drink, drugs and law reform: a review of 
Law Commission Report No.314’ (2009) Criminal Law Review, pp.488-501; D. Husak, ‘Intoxication and 
culpability’ (2012) Criminal Law and Philosophy, pp.363-379, at 366-8; R. Williams, ‘Voluntary intoxication – a 
lost cause?’ (2013) Law Quarterly Review, pp.264-289, at 266-71.  
63 See, W. Wilson, ‘The structure of criminal defences’ (2005) Criminal Law Review, pp.108-121, at 110-112; W. 
Wilson, ‘The filtering role of crisis in the constitution of criminal excuses’ (2004) Canadian Journal of Law and 
or even that we might have acted similarly in her position. Individuals may be driven to 
criminal acts by any number of societal, economic and/or social factors, but allowance for 
these is rarely encountered at the liability stage, with the narrow focus of legal review (a theme 
we began with) unable and/or unwilling to engage with longer term factors.64 What is vital is 
the combination of understandable conduct within the context of immediate crisis. Crisis 
allows us to sympathise with D, but to do so in knowledge that D’s conduct was isolated and 
temporary, reassured that such conduct does not represent a continuing danger.65    
 
Once we acknowledge the central role of ‘crisis’ within criminal defences, the threat of 
contrived defences and prior fault becomes clear. We can accept people committing even very 
serious wrongs within crisis situations (e.g., killing in circumstances of self-defence), 
reassured by the fact that D had no real choice; that she was trapped; that we might have done 
the same ourselves. However, where D has constructed that crisis herself by her conduct at T1 
(e.g., by provoking V to attack her), she changes her normative position at T2.66 D is no longer 
a victim of circumstance; she has chosen; and she is removed from our sympathy.67 Our task 
then is to articulate rules of prior fault that can identify when D has constructed the crisis 
relied upon within her defence.    
 
Our preferred approach to prior fault 
The approach to prior fault recommended in this paper requires a court to answer two 
questions about D’s mental state at T1.  
 
D performs acts at T1 capable of creating the circumstances for her defence at T2 (e.g., 
inciting violence from V).   
 
1. Was D reckless at T1 as to her own criminal conduct at T2 (e.g., killing V)? and 
 
2. Was D reckless at T1 as to causing the circumstances of her defence at T2 (e.g., 
causing V to attack her)? 
 
If the answer to both of these questions is ‘yes’, then D’s potential defence at T2 
should be blocked and D should be liable for the original offence.  
 
Both limbs of the preferred test are essential to undermine D’s claim of an unconstructed 
crisis, and with it her claim for a criminal defence. Under the first limb, we require D to foresee 
at T1 that she may later commit an offence. We see foresight of personal offending as essential 
within the contrived defence model, and essential to undermine the claim that D was later 
trapped within a crisis. Under the second limb, it is essential not only that D foresees at T1 the 
potential circumstances of her defence at T2 (e.g., the need for defensive force; threats from X 
to commit an offence; impacts of a mental condition; etc.), but also that D must be reckless as 
to causing them. The causal element here has a vital role in narrowing prior fault rules to 
contrived defences only. For example, D, as a police officer, may foresee future encounters 
with violent individuals where self-defensive force may become necessary. However, despite 
foreseeing the use of force, and the use of a potential defence, D will not (if acting legitimately) 
foresee being the cause of circumstances leading to that defence.68  
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There are three aspects of the proposed prior fault rules that require some further comment. 
First, the choice of a recklessness standard within both limbs of the test. Second, how much 
detail D is required to foresee at T1 for both limbs of the test. And third, why we have not 
included a causal requirement between D’s conduct at T1 and the need for a defence at T2.   
 
Our adoption of a recklessness standard within both limbs of the proposed test is important. 
In order to demonstrate that D’s defence is contrived in some way, and that her conduct at T1 
has manufactured the crisis at T2, we believe that subject fault is essential. It is not simply that 
D ‘started it’, but that she chose to continue with conduct that risked criminal harms in 
defensive circumstances.69 However, despite the requirement of subjective fault, we do not 
agree with commentators who advocate a narrow test of intention,70 or one that requires D to 
possess a mens rea at T1 that mirrors that of the offence at T2.71 Although narrow tests of this 
kind seem appropriate where prior fault rules are employed for constructing offences, for 
establishing equivalence with missing mens rea, in the context of defences we believe they are 
too generous to D. As we explored in Part 1, intention-based contrived defences very rarely 
arise in practice, and demonstrating intention in this context can be extremely difficult. We do 
not agree with the courts (in the context of defences such as duress) where difficulty of proof 
has led them to accept a negligence standard of fault, but we do believe that recklessness is 
sufficient. Where D subjectively foresees at T1 that her conduct may later result in an offence, 
and where she foresees that she may cause the conditions of a defence, we believe that it is 
legitimate for the law to require her to change course. Where D chooses to continue, any claim 
to have been trapped in a crisis becomes hollow, and her defence should be blocked.  
 
Although a recklessness standard requires subjective foresight from D, several commentators 
have raised concerns that it may cast the prior fault rules too widely. This is the case where D 
foresees the risks discussed above, but her conduct is not blameworthy, and so we would not 
want to block her use of a defence. For example, where D wears provocative clothing on a night 
out, or D (a black woman) walks through an area known for race related violence, she may 
foresee attack from V and she may foresee the use of defence.72 In answering concerns of this 
kind, it is vital to remember the two elements within the definition of ‘recklessness’ as a mens 
rea term.73 The first element requires foresight of a relevant risk, and it is accepted that this is 
present in the examples above. However, the second element requires D to have run that risk 
unreasonably. Thus, where D wears provocative clothing in our example, or walks through a 
violent area, she may foresee attack from V; she may foresee the use of defence; but she will 
not (usually) be reckless to either because her running of the risk is not unreasonable. D’s 
defence will only be blocked where her conduct at T1 demonstrates the unreasonable running 
of a risk, for example where she goes out hoping to use defensive force as a form of 
vigilantism.74  
 
The second aspect of our recommended test that requires comment, is the level of detail in 
which D must foresee the relevant risks at T1. For example, must D foresee the exact offence 
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that she will commit at T2 or simply the potential for offending; must she foresee precisely 
how her conduct will create the conditions of her defence; and so on. This is also an area in 
which we found inconsistency within the current law in Part 1, with certain offences requiring 
specific foresight of details at T1 (e.g., self-defence and the loss of control defence), others 
either being unclear (e.g., insanity), and others requiring foresight of only non-specific 
dangers (e.g., duress). In our view, it is unnecessary and counterproductive to require D to 
have foreseen every detail of the events at T2, as the reality of complex criminal situations 
makes such foresight unlikely (and very difficult to prove). However, in order to demonstrate 
that D’s defence is contrived and should be blocked, we contend that D must have at least 
foreseen the events at T2 with some general accuracy (e.g., the type of offending, the 
circumstances she is causing, etc.). We also believe that some discretion here can be useful. 
For example, in the context of duress, D may foresee the risk of being coerced into minor 
offences, but later be coerced into very different, and/or more serious offences. Indeed, similar 
differences can arise across each of the defences (e.g., where V reacts more extremely than D 
anticipates to her provocation, where D’s mental condition has a greater than expected impact, 
and so on). In such cases, it is likely that D’s recklessness will satisfy the recommended test 
and her defence will be blocked. However, where the disparity between D’s expectations and 
reality is particularly great, it will be open to D to claim that her foresight fell outside the prior 
fault rules and they should not apply. This could be the case in duress, for example, where D 
joins a group of shoplifters foreseeing a chance of being coerced into other property offences, 
but is later coerced into committing a serious sexual offence.  
 
The third, and final, aspect of the recommended test that we would like to expand upon here 
is the choice not to include a causal requirement. It is required that D performs acts ‘capable’ 
of procuring the circumstances of her defence, and that (under the second limb of the test) she 
is reckless as to doing so, but no demonstration of causation is actually required. The decision 
not to require causation means that the recommended test avoids the problems highlighted 
with Robinson’s approach discussed in Part 2. However, it may lead to problems in cases 
where, despite D’s recklessness, the events at T2 are not in fact impacted by D’s conduct at all. 
For example, if D taunts V to provoke a reaction, and V attacks, should D’s defence still be 
blocked if it transpires that her provocation had no effect on V who was planning to attack 
anyway? D may be reckless at T1, but she did not create a risk.75 Despite the potential for cases 
of this kind, we do not believe that causation should be required. It is contended that, in these 
very few cases, even when D has not in fact created the circumstances of her defence, her 
attempt to do so is still a reasonable basis for denying that she has been trapped in a crisis, 
and denying her a defence.   
 
An exception for belief based defences? 
Having set out our recommended approach for prior fault rules, only one issue remains. That 
is whether we should create an exception, or an additional test, to apply in the context of belief 
based defences and intoxicated mistakes. Take the following example. D becomes voluntarily 
intoxicated at T1, but does not foresee any future offending. Later, at T2, D’s intoxicated state 
leads her to mistake V’s actions as threatening, and D assaults V in apparent self-defence. As 
we discussed in Part 1, the current law of self-defence is applied where D honestly (but not 
necessarily reasonably) believes that it is necessary to use defensive force. This applies even 
where D was wrong about the necessity of the force. However, under the current law, D may 
not rely on an intoxicated mistake. Thus, in cases such as our example, D’s belief based defence 
will be effectively blocked by her objective prior fault (her voluntary intoxication at T1).    
 
Our preferred approach to prior fault and defences, set out above, would not apply to 
intoxicated mistake cases unless D demonstrated the relevant recklessness at T1. Thus, in our 
example above, D’s use of self-defence would not be blocked. The question now, then, is 
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whether we should recommend additional rules in order to ensure consistency with the 
current law. We must ask whether the general fault displayed by D’s voluntary intoxication at 
T1 is sufficient (and sufficiently different from other forms of unreasonable belief) that it 
should undermine her defence. Our focus is not whether D is trapped in a crisis (D is mistaken 
and therefore, in reality, is not trapped). Rather, our focus is on what we want or expect of D 
where she thinks she is trapped. As in our example, where D mistakenly believes she is under 
attack (or that another is under attack), do we want her to act in defence (in which case the 
defence should be allowed) or not (in which case it should be blocked)? 
 
Contrary to the current law, we believe that intoxicated mistakes do not demonstrate sufficient 
prior fault to justify the blocking of a belief based defence. As we discussed in the previous 
section, we believe that D’s defence should only be blocked where it is contrived; where D has 
foreseen the relevant risks from her conduct at T1; and where she has chosen to run those 
risks. Where D simply makes a mistake as a result of her intoxication, no such choices have 
been made, and so D’s prior fault is not sufficient to undermine her claim of crisis. Further, 
whilst we see principled reasons for not blocking D’s defence in these circumstances, the 
inconsistencies within the current law expose the lack of principle at play. We have already 
discussed the inconsistency of intoxicated mistake rules between different belief based 
defences in Part 1. But even beyond this, the rule is also inconsistent in its application within 
single defences. For example, although D’s intoxicated mistakes can (in effect) block her use 
of self-defence, mistakes arising from a mental illness caused by similar voluntary intoxication 
over a period of time will not block her defence.76 Adopting our recommended approach would 
bring consistency and coherence to the law.77   
 
Although we do not believe that any general exception is required to our recommended 
approach in the context of belief based defences, it may be that a narrow exception is 
warranted in certain cases. Our concern here is inspired by a long standing view from the 
authors of Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law that intoxicated mistakes should only block 
defences to basic intent offences and not specific intent offences.78 We do not agree with this 
position: it seems odd that the availability of a defence should depend upon the mens rea 
requirements of the offence charged, especially where D’s intoxication may not have resulted 
in a lack of mens rea. However, beneath the position set out in the textbook lays a difficult 
case. Let us imagine that D only commits an offence because her mens rea is constructed by 
the intoxication rules; or even better, that D commits a properly constructed intoxication 
offence on the basis of causing harm whilst intoxicated.79 And let’s imagine further that the 
same intoxication forms the basis of D’s defence. For example, D takes a hallucinogenic drug 
at T1, and then kills V at T2 in the mistaken belief that V is attacking her.  
 
It would be highly unintuitive for the law to rely upon D’s intoxication as a necessary element 
of fault within the construction of her crime, but also to allow her to rely on that same 
intoxication to avoid liability when applying defences. Indeed, we do not think it would be 
right. Thus, in the context of any new intoxication offence, we contend that D should not be 
able to rely on an intoxicated mistake as part of her defence. This creates an exception to our 
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general test, but we believe it is a narrow exception that will only apply in appropriate cases: 
if we believe that D should be criminalised for causing harm whilst intoxicated, then in this 
context only D’s intoxication takes on a special status when applying defences as well. Where 
D is charged with any other offence that is not specifically criminalising her choice to become 
intoxicated, our standard prior fault rules should be applied without exception.   
 
Conclusion 
The current law relating to prior fault has arisen and developed within the common law, and 
has done so in response to a number of challenging cases. However, as Part 1 of this article has 
demonstrated, the inconsistencies and incoherence that have become established within those 
rules make the case for reform and codification a very strong one. And this, in essence, has 
been the purpose of this paper. Building on discussion within the case law, and building upon 
a range of academic analysis, we have sought to define the terms of the problem (isolating the 
issue of prior fault within defences) and then provided an option for reform.  
 
Reform can, of course, come in many forms. The approach we have advocated could be 
adopted through common law clarifications, or through the individual codification of specific 
defences. However, given the breadth of the issue across defences, and given the need for a 
consistent approach argued for in this paper, the ideal place for clarifying prior fault rules 
would be within the general part of a criminal code. The potential for general codification of 
the criminal law in jurisdictions such as Jersey presents a unique opportunity, and one that 
should not be passed up.        
 
